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Interpreting Vague Provisions of the Alternative
Investment Fund Managers Directive Through a
Systemic Cost-Benefit Analysis
Zeshawn Qadir

Abstract
The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (Directive) is a European Union
(EU) directive issued in response to recent economic crises with the goal of reducing systemic
economic risk and protecting EU investors, primarily through enhanced corporate governance
requirements, leverage limits, liquidity requirements, transparency measures, and disclosure
requirements. The Directive regulates alternative investment fund managers and creates two
harmonized regulatory regimes called “passport systems,” one for use by EU fund managers, and
one for use by third-country fund managers. The passport system for EU fund managers is
already in effect, but the European Commission has not yet implemented the passport system
regulating third-country fund managers.
The third-country passport system is a novelty in EU law and invokes unique policy issues.
For example, both EU and third-country regulatory authorities face the challenge of supervising
and enforcing compliance by third-country fund managers with the Directive. They also must
determine how to address regulatory arbitrage that results from discrepancies in the legal
frameworks of different jurisdictions. Furthermore, the Directive contains numerous vague
provisions that are relevant to the implementation of the third-country passport regime; and the
ways in which these provisions are interpreted will have significant consequences for stakeholders.
This Comment constructs and applies a systemic cost-benefit analysis framework and
assesses the merits of potential interpretations of the Directive’s provisions. The framework
incorporates the Directive’s policy objectives, applicable regulations, and related EU financial
law, as well as the private and social costs imposed by each interpretation. This Comment
illustrates this framework’s utility by applying it to two vague provisions of the Directive that are
significant in light of the pending expansion of the passport system to cover third-country funds
and fund managers. In the course of analyzing these two provisions, this Comment raises
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important considerations that are relevant in evaluating interpretations of numerous other
provisions of the Directive. Finally, this Comment suggests which interpretation is preferred for
the two provisions examined and discusses important empirical assumptions and questions,
highlighting relevant facts that may favor a different interpretation.
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I. I NTRODUCTIO N
The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD or the
Directive) is a European Union (EU) law that addresses the high level of economic
instability and systemic risk revealed by recent financial crises.1 The European
Commission (the Commission) promulgated this law in 2010 to address the
inadequate protection for investors and to manage and minimize the systemic risk
created by hedge funds and other relatively risky investment vehicles.2 The
Directive labels these funds as “alternative investment funds” (funds) and refers
to their managers as “alternative investment fund managers” (fund managers).3
The Directive’s primary policy objectives are (1) risk management and (2)
the creation of a unified, or “harmonized,” regulatory framework that allows fund
managers to market and manage funds across EU countries (Member States) if
they meet the Directive’s requirements.4 The first policy goal of “risk
management” includes addressing both systemic market risks and providing
greater protection to EU investors.5 The second policy goal concerning the
creation of a “harmonized [p]an-European regulatory framework” is intended to
increase transparency in the alternative investment funds market by applying
uniform rules to the conduct of fund managers active in the EU, and to protect
EU fund managers that comply with the Directive from competitors in thirdcountries that have weaker regulations.6
The Directive creates this harmonized regulatory framework through a
“passport” regime that allows fund managers that comply with the Directive’s
provisions to provide services throughout the EU “on the basis of a single

1

2

Gianna Sagan, Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive Impact on Non-EU Managers, 34 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 506, 506 (2014).
Alexandros Seretakis, Taming the Locusts?, Embattled Hedge Funds in the E.U., 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS.
115, 137 (2013) (noting that the target of the EU regulators was mainly hedge funds, but the
Directive also applies to private equity funds, real estate funds, and commodity capital funds).

3

Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on
Alternative Investment Fund Managers and Amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC
and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 1 (AIFMD),
recitals 2-4 [hereinafter AIFMD].

4

5

Dirk A. Zetzsche, Introduction, to THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND MANAGERS DIRECTIVE, 1,
10-11 (Dirk Zetzsche ed. 2d ed., 2015). The Directive covers all European Economic Area (EEA)
member states, which includes all EU countries as well as Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein.
However, for ease of reference and to maintain consistency with the Directive’s language, I will use
the term “EU.” Id. at 20.
Id. at 10.

6

See id. at 11. See also AIFMD, supra note 3, at recital 4.
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authori[z]ation.”7 In particular, once a fund manager is authorized in one Member
State, the fund manager will be able to market funds to professional investors in
all Member States.8 Currently, the passport system is available only to EU fund
managers managing and marketing EU funds.9 However, in accordance with the
Directive, the Commission will expand it by enacting a legislative act that creates
a corresponding passport regime (third-country passport) applicable to thirdcountry fund managers and to EU fund managers that manage third-country
funds.10 Only the EU passport is currently in effect; the third-country passport
system has not yet been implemented.11
A pan-European passport regime for third-countries is a novelty in EU law.12
The legislation that implements this new passport regime ideally will address the
important policy considerations that it raises. A primary concern is a lack of
coherence between the two passport systems, which may lead to “regulatory
arbitrage.” In the context of this Comment, “regulatory arbitrage” refers to
situations in which fund managers choose whether to register their funds in a
Member State or a third-country based on which regulatory regime imposes lower
costs or burdens relative to its benefits.13 A second major concern is whether the
third-country passport regime will afford EU investors the same level of
protection as the EU passport.14
7

8
9
10

11

12

Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (‘AIFMD’): Frequently Asked Questions (EC)
Memo/10/572, 3 (Nov. 11, 2010).
Id.
AIFMD, supra note 3, at recital 4.
Id. (stating that a harmonized passport regime will become applicable to non-EU fund managers
and EU fund managers managing non-EU funds after the Commission delegates an act that so
provides). I will use the phrases “third-country” and “non-EU” interchangeably to refer to fund
managers and funds based outside of the EU.
ESMA’s Advice to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on the Application
of the AIFMD Passport to Non-EU AIFMs and AIFs, at 5 (July 30, 2015), available at
http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2015-1236_advice_to_ep-council-com_on_aifmd_
passport.pdf [hereinafter ESMA’s Advice].
William Yonge, AIFMD: Renewed Focus on Its Impact on Non-EU Managers of Private Funds, MORGAN
LEWIS PUBLICATIONS, July 22, 2014, https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/pif_aifmdrenewed
focusimpactonnoneuprivatefundmanagers_22july14.

13

See Hossein Nabilou & Alessio M. Pacces, The Hedge Fund Regulation Dilemma: Direct vs. Indirect
Regulation, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 183, 194 (2015) (“The degree to which a firm engages in
regulatory arbitrage . . . is a function of the private costs and benefits of regulation and the existence
of alternative regulatory regimes available to the firm. Assuming two alternative regulatory regimes
and zero switching costs, a firm facing marginal costs of a regulatory regime ‘A’ that exceed its
marginal benefits will tend to locate its business in jurisdiction ‘B’ where the marginal benefits of
regulation exceed its marginal costs”). See also AIFMD, supra note 3, at art. 4(1)(j) (defining where
fund managers and funds are “established” on the basis of the location of their registered office).

14

Zetzsche, supra note 4, at 1, 10.
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The ability of the Directive to serve its policy objectives in a practical and
effective manner depends on how the Commission or a given country’s regulators
interpret its provisions, and how consistently these provisions are enforced across
jurisdictions. Although the Commission has promulgated several regulations that
have clarified and supplemented portions of the Directive, these regulations have
not adequately addressed some important but vaguely worded articles.15 While the
Commission should by no means address every ambiguity in the Directive, it
should more clearly define the scope and implications of those provisions that
have a significant impact on key stakeholders and that have been interpreted in
contradictory ways by various jurisdictions. In doing so, the Commission will
promote consistent application of the Directive and reduce legal uncertainty for
fund managers. This uncertainty increases the liability risks and costs for many
fund managers, as well as their counterparties and investors.16
Unfortunately, there is scant literature analyzing alternative interpretations
of the Directive’s vague provisions that might help the Commission interpret
them so as to promote the Directive’s policy objectives, while minimizing private
and social costs. “Private costs” include costs to individual economic agents like
firms, fund managers, investors, or other financial market participants that result
from an event, action, or policy change.17 In contrast, “social costs” refers to the
costs to society as a whole from an event, action, or policy change and includes
negative externalities and private costs that are not simply transfers to others.18
This Comment aims to help fill this analytical gap by providing a cost-benefit
analysis framework that can be used to analyze vague rules in the Directive, and
applies it to two provisions that are particularly important in light of the passport
system’s expansion. The interpretation of these provisions will significantly affect
whether the Directive meets its policy objectives, and also will affect the costs to
relevant stakeholders.19
Section II of this Comment discusses the Directive’s scope, provides an
overview of its legislative framework, and reviews its substantive requirements.
Section III considers the regulatory burdens third-country fund managers face and
discusses the “national private placement regimes” that are the only present means
of authorization under the Directive for third-country fund managers. Finally,
15

Dirk A. Zetzsche & Thomas Marte, The AIFMD’s Cross-Border Dimension, Third-Country Rules and the
Equivalence Concept, in THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND MANAGERS DIRECTIVE, supra note 4,
at 431, 473-474.

16

Sagan, supra note 1, at 515; Zetzsche, supra note 4, at 1, 10.
Private cost, ALAN V. DEARDORFF, DEARDORFF’S GLOSSARY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS,
http://www-personal.umich.edu/~alandear/glossary/index.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
Social cost, ALAN V. DEARDORFF, DEARDORFF’S GLOSSARY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS, http://www-personal.umich.edu/~alandear/glossary/index.html (last visited April
10, 2016).

17

18

19

Zetzsche, supra note 4, at 1, 10.
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Section IV discusses two vague Directive provisions that substantially bear on the
passport regime’s expansion to third-countries. It approaches two possible
interpretations of each provision through a “systemic” cost-benefit analysis
framework that incorporates the Directive’s policy objectives, the Directive’s
language and associated regulations, relevant EU financial law, and private and
social costs. Section IV also analyzes the interpretations for each Directive
provision by identifying crucial empirical questions and indicating relevant factual
information that may bear on which interpretation is preferred.

II. T HE D IRECTIVE : S C OPE , C ONTENT , AND A CCESS
This Section briefly discusses the Directive’s scope in terms of the types of
investment fund managers it applies to, the categories of funds within its purview,
and the class of investors that it protects. It also explains how the Commission
and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) have set forth
regulations that implement the Directive’s provisions. The Section further
discusses some of the Directive’s significant substantive requirements. Lastly, it
concludes by explaining how third-country fund managers currently can only
access the EU market through the “national private placement regime,” but that
the Directive contemplates their transition to a third-country passport system.

A. The Directive’s Scope and Content
The Directive defines an alternative investment fund manager, or “AIFM,”
to include any “legal person[s] whose regular business is managing one or more
AIFs.”20 An alternative investment fund, or “AIF,” is defined as a “collective
investment undertaking[ ]…which raise[s] capital from a number of investors,
with a view to investing it in accordance with a defined investment policy for the
benefit of those investors” and which does not need to be registered under the
Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive
(UCITSD).21 The AIMFD includes all funds that do not fall within the scope and
authority of the UCITSD, “including hedge funds, private equity funds,
commodity funds or real estate funds.”22 The UCITSD covers funds authorized
to be sold to the retail market, like mutual funds, while funds under the AIFMD
are considered to have risk levels unsuitable for retail investors.23

20
21

AIFMD, supra note 3, art. 4(1)(b).
Id. at art. 4(1)(a).

22

Anne Rivière, The Future of Hedge Fund Regulation: A Comparative Approach, 10 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. &
BUS. 263, 279 (2011).

23

Id.
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The Directive’s scope is limited to “professional investors.”24 The term
“professional investor” refers to “an investor which is considered to be a
professional client or may, on request, be treated as a professional client within
the meaning of Annex II to Directive 2004/39/EC.”25 Additionally, only fund
managers that engage in the “management” or “marketing” of funds within the
EU fall under the ambit of the Directive.26 The term “marketing” has been subject
to divisive interpretations by the national authorities of Member States that are
empowered by law or regulation to supervise fund managers (Competent
Authorities).27
The Directive grants authority to the Commission to delegate legislative acts
that implement its provisions.28 These legislative acts are called “Level 2”
measures, and consist of the Commission Delegated Regulation No 231/2013
(Primary Directive Regulation) as the main body of implementing legislation,
along with three smaller regulations.29 The Directive’s legal framework also
includes “Level 3” measures, which consist of guidelines issued by the ESMA.
These guidelines deal with the Directive’s scope, reporting obligations,
remuneration, and a number of other issues with regulatory implications.30
With regards to its substantive content, the Directive imposes “minimum
capital requirements, as well as conflicts of interest, risk and liquidity management
requirements, an independent valuation of assets, threshold disclosure, and would
24

25

26
27

28
29

30

However, the Directive specifically recognizes that Member States can allow marketing to retail
investors and can impose stricter requirements if they choose to do so. AIFMD, supra note 3, art.
43(1).
Id. at art. 4(1)(ag) (citing Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
21 April 2004 on Markets in Financial Instruments Amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC
and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and
Repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC, 2004 O.J. (L 145) annex II, (defining “professional
client” as a “client who possesses the experience, knowledge and expertise to make its own
investment decisions and properly asses the risks that it incurs” and including a list of institutional
investors as examples)).
See id. at recital 4.
See id. at art. 4(1)(f) (defining “competent authorities” as “the national authorities of Member States
which are empowered by law or regulation to supervise [fund managers]”). For a discussion of
plausible interpretations of the term “marketing,” see infra Section IV.A.
See Zetzsche, supra note 4, at 1, 7.
Id. See also Commission Delegated Regulation 231/2013 of 19 December 2012, Supplementing
Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with Regard to Exemptions,
General Operating Conditions, Depositaries, Leverage, Transparency and Supervision, 2012 O.J.
(L 83) [hereinafter Primary Directive Regulation].
See Letter from Verena Ross, Exec. Director of European Securities and Markets Authority, to
Roberto Gualtieri, Chair of the European Parliament (July 30, 2015), available at
http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/esma-2015-1233.pdf (noting that ESMA’s area of
expertise and responsibility falls in the realm of regulatory concerns).
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limit the fund’s use of leverage.”31 Additionally, Articles 19-21 impose
transparency requirements that require greater disclosure and will help lower
asymmetric information and increase investor confidence in funds.32 Moreover,
the Directive requires significant disclosures that are expected to increase
regulatory oversight of fund operations and to reduce the systemic risk associated
with them.33 Among these requirements are an annual report for each fund
managed or marketed in the EU and disclosures “regarding the main markets in
which the [fund manager] trades, the principal exposures, and most importantly
concentrations of each fund managed.”34

B. The Passport System and Natio nal Private Placement
Regimes
As discussed in Section I, the Directive provides for both an EU and thirdcountry “passport” regime, which is a harmonized regulatory framework that
allows fund managers to market and manage funds across the EU with a single
authorization.35 Nevertheless, as a directive, the AIFMD is binding, “as to the
result to be achieved upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall
leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods.”36 Accordingly,
each Member State has broad discretion in how it implements and enforces the
passport system.37
Currently, the passport system is available only to EU fund managers
managing EU funds.38 Third-country fund managers cannot market or manage
funds under the EU passport system, nor can EU fund managers manage nonEU funds under it.39 Fund managers unable to access the EU passport system
must instead obtain access to EU investors through a country-by-country
authorization regime referred to as the “national private placement regime.”40
31

Rivière, supra note 22, at 311.

32

Id.
Id. (citing Charles River Assocs., Impact of the Proposed AIFM Directive Across Europe, 36–37 (2009),
available at http://www.crai.com/ProfessionalStaff/AuxListingDetails.aspx?id=11778&flD=34.
Seretakis, supra note 2, at 139.

33

34
35
36

37

Zetzsche, supra note 4, at 1, 20.
Barbara C. George & Lynn V. Dymally, The End of An Era of Limited Oversight: The Restructured
Regulatory Landscape of Private Investment Funds Through the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act and the
E.U. Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive, 25 FLA. J. INT’L L. 207, 210 n.8 (2013) (citing
the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, art. 189).
See AIFMD, supra note 3, at recital 64.

39

Zetzsche, supra note 4, at 1, 20.
AIFMD, supra note 3, at recital 4.

40

Id. at 85.

38
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Under the national private placement regime, a fund manager based outside of the
EU must separately apply for registration in each Member State in which the fund
manager wishes to market or manage funds.41 Thus, unlike the passport system,
the national private placement regime does not allow a fund manager to market
and manage their funds across all EU Member States following a single
authorization process.42
In order to be authorized under the national private placement regime, thirdcountry fund managers must comply with Chapter IV of the Directive concerning
transparency requirements. These include making available an annual report,
providing certain disclosures to investors, and meeting reporting obligations to
Competent Authorities of Member States in which they market or manage funds.43
They must also have a “cooperation agreement” in place that provides for an
exchange of information between EU Member States in which they market or
manage funds and their third-country regulatory authorities. Finally, third-country
fund managers must not be located in a country that the Financial Action Task
Force on anti-money laundering and terrorist financing has listed as a noncooperative country or territory.44
Under their respective country-specific national private placement regimes,
Member States “may impose stricter rules on the [fund manager] than those
provided for by the AIFMD for the purpose of country-by-country marketing.”45
Consequently, fund managers face significant costs and difficulties complying
with the different registration requirements in each Member State in which they
market or manage funds under the national private placement regime.46 This
burden can be quite high for fund managers who intend to market or manage their
funds throughout the EU, as third-country fund managers have to report to “as
many as 27 different regulators.”47

41

42
43
44
45
46

47

AIFMD 2014 Update – Private Placements: Where Did We End Up, and Where Are We Going?, SIDLEY
UPDATES (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.sidley.com/news/2014-09-08-investment-funds-update
(noting that “the process and rules by which the AIFs can be marketed are entirely a matter of local
Member State law and process”) [hereinafter Sidley Updates].
Sagan, supra note 1, at 511.
Zetzsche & Marte, supra note 4, at 431, 451 (citing AIFMD arts. 22-24).
Id. at 455.
Id. at 451.
Sagan, supra note 1, at 510 (indicating that “most EU states vary in their regulatory requirements in
some way which makes compliance difficult, adding to the time and cost it takes for [fund managers]
to participate in the EU economy.”).
Id. at 507.
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III. T HE E XPANSION OF THE P ASSPORT S YSTEM TO
T HIRD -C OUNTR IES
As laid out in Article 67(1) of the Directive, in July 2015 the ESMA was to
issue to the European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission an opinion
on the functioning of the passport system for EU fund managers and on the
functioning of the national private placement regimes set out in Articles 36 and
42. Additionally, the ESMA was required to provide advice on the application of
the passport system to third-country fund managers and funds “in accordance
with the rules set out in Article 35 and Articles 37 to 41 of the AIFMD.”48
On July 30, 2015, the ESMA issued its advice in a detailed report.49 The
report sets out the ESMA’s analysis and suggestions concerning the application
of the passport to six non-EU countries: Guernsey, Hong Kong, Jersey,
Switzerland, Singapore, and the United States.50 The ESMA selected these
jurisdictions based on a number of factors including
the amount of activity already being carried out by entities from these
countries under the [national private placement regimes], the existing
knowledge and experience of EU [Competent Authorities] with respect to
their counterparts in these jurisdictions and the efforts made by stakeholders
from these countries to engage with the process.51

The ESMA opted for a “country-by-country assessment of the potential
extension of the AIMFD passport” because this will allow for greater flexibility in
its assessments and an individualized comparison of the different legal
frameworks in third-countries that enforce the Directive.52 The ESMA will issue
positive advice for a particular country’s admission to the third-country passport
regime if “there are no significant obstacles regarding investor protection, market
disruption, competition and the monitoring of systemic risk, impeding the
application of the passport.”53 The ESMA will continue to assess other thirdcountries and provide additional submissions to the European Parliament, the
Council, and the Commission concerning the extension of the passport system to
those countries.54
Implementing the third-country passport will result in a “single regulatory
and supervisory regime for all [fund managers] active in the EU” because all fund
48
49
50
51

ESMA’s Advice, supra note 11, at 4.
Id.
See generally id.
Id. ¶ 34.

53

Id. ¶ 8.
AIFMD, supra note 3, art. 67(4).

54

ESMA’s Advice, supra note 11, at 4.

52
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managers marketing or managing funds in the EU will be subject to the passport
regime and the Directive’s requirements.55 If the law works as planned, this
harmonized regime will “help market participants to overcome the barriers and
inefficiencies created by the current patchwork of national regulation” under the
national private placement regime.56 Additionally, the expanded passport regime
will ideally level the playing field for all fund managers and generate a consistently
high level of transparency that will promote competition and consumer choice for
EU investors.57

IV. I NTERPRETING I MP ORTANT BUT V AGUE P ROVISIONS OF
THE AIFMD AND I MPLICATIONS FOR A T HIRD -C O UNTRY
P ASSPORT R EGIME
As the ESMA continues to consider which countries to admit to the thirdcountry passport system, both the ESMA and Commission should place greater
emphasis on how important but inherently vague principles of the Directive
should be interpreted, clarified, and enforced with respect to the passport regime.
Otherwise, Member States will continue to apply vague provisions differently.58
Under the passport regime, Member States authorize fund managers to market
their funds to investors across the EU, supervise fund manager activities, and
enforce the Directive. Accordingly, the potential for different interpretations
fosters legal uncertainty for stakeholders, promotes inconsistent outcomes, and
undermines the creation of a level playing field with a high level of transparency.59
This Section will consider two vague provisions of the Directive. The first is
the definition of “marketing” under Article 4(x) and the second is the “equivalence
requirement” in Article 37(2). This Section will advance two interpretations for
each of these provisions and perform a high-level cost-benefit analysis to assess
the merits and consequences of each approach.60
55

56
57
58

59

60

Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (‘AIFMD’): Frequently Asked Questions, supra
note 7, at 3.
Id.
Id.
This is true under the national private placement regime for the reasons discussed in Section II.B,
supra. This is also true under the passport regime because although only one Member State will need
to authorize a fund manager to market a fund throughout the EU, Member States that provide such
authorizations can still interpret and enforce the Directive differently if vague provisions are not
clarified or interpreted by means of binding regulations. See George & Dymally, supra note 36, at
260.
See Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (‘AIFMD’): Frequently Asked Questions,
supra note 7, at 3.
For both of the provisions examined, the discussion of benefits and costs has some overlap because
the proposed interpretations for each are approximately opposites.
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The term “marketing” is used throughout the Directive and defines the
boundaries of the law’s application. In particular, if a third-country fund manager
engages in “marketing” within the EU or directed at EU investors, it becomes
subject to the Directive.61 As a result, clearly defining “marketing” is crucial since
it will determine whether third-country fund managers must comply with the
Directive’s strict regulatory framework. In contrast, the “equivalence
requirement” under Article 37(2) exempts fund managers from compliance with
a particular rule of the Directive if they are subject to a conflicting third-country
rule and certain conditions are met.62 Importantly, the equivalence requirement’s
scope will affect how often third-country fund managers can circumvent the
Directive’s requirements.63
In evaluating the proposed interpretations of marketing and the equivalence
requirement, this Comment will focus on a set of factors based on the “Systemic
Approach.”64 This standard is articulated and applied in the second edition of
“The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive,” which is one of the most
comprehensive recent works covering the Directive.65 The Systemic Approach
considers the general purpose and goals of the Directive, as well as the relevance
of other directives and general principles of EU law.66 It is a useful framework
because it promotes consistency with legislative intent and the Directive’s policy
goals, while considering its context within a larger EU financial law regime that
includes analogous provisions and principles.67
As discussed in Section I, the Directive’s two primary policy goals are (1)
risk management, which includes addressing systemic economic risk and
protecting EU investors, and (2) the creation of a harmonized passport regime.
61

See AIFMD, supra note 3, at recital 13 (noting that the Directive is applicable to all EU fund
managers that manage [funds] and all third-country fund managers that market [funds] in the EU)
(emphasis added).

62

Id. at art. 37(2). See also. Zetzsche & Marte, supra note 4, at 431, 471 (referring to this as the
“equivalence requirement”).

63

See infra Section IV.B.
Zetzsche & Marte, supra note 15, at 431, 477.

64
65

66
67

Dirk A. Zetzsche, Preface to the First Edition, of THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND MANAGERS
DIRECTIVE, supra note 4, at 1xv, 1xv (discussing the extensive and thorough analysis of the Directive
accomplished by the text). See also Zetzsche & Marte, supra note 4, at 431, 477 (explaining the basis
for the “Systemic Approach”). This text was edited by Dirk A. Zetzsche, a professor of law at the
University of Liechtenstein that has done advisory work for the European Commission, European
Parliament, and ESMA. List of Contributors, in THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND MANAGERS
DIRECTIVE, supra note 15, at v, v.
Zetzsche, supra note 4, at 1xv, 1xv.
See id. (observing that an isolated approach that doesn’t consider other directives or general
principles of EU law risks “making a number of the AIFMD’s provisions lose their purpose and
undermine the goals pursued by the regulation of the [fund managers]”).
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Determining the effects of different Directive interpretations on systemic
economic risk would require a fact-dependent and sophisticated analysis that is
better left to EU agencies with the resources and access to relevant data, like the
ESMA. Accordingly, this Comment will focus on how effectively the
interpretations protect EU investors and promote a harmonized passport regime
that equally applies the law to EU and third-country fund managers.68
Moreover, this Comment will assess the proposed interpretations based on
how coherent they are with the Directive’s plain language and how well they
incorporate principles from associated regulations. Like the Systemic Approach,
the analysis of the interpretations for each vague provision will also take into
account their consistency with relevant directives and other EU financial law.
However, this Comment incorporates one additional aspect that was not included
in the Systemic Approach, namely, the creation of private and social costs. These
costs will vary for different interpretations and will affect the incentives of fund
managers, the risks and expenses that investors and other stakeholders are subject
to, and the broader economic consequences of the Directive’s enforcement.
Consequently, the cost-benefit analysis of the marketing and equivalence
requirement provisions will emphasize five factors: (1) protection of EU investors;
(2) promotion of a harmonized regime that equally applies the law to EU and
third-country fund managers; (3) consistency with the Directive’s language and
with associated regulations; (4) relation to relevant EU financial law; and (5)
creation of private and social costs. Because this model is based on the Systemic
Approach, it will be referred to as a “systemic” cost-benefit analysis framework.
The cost-benefit analysis for each vague provision discussed aims to reveal
the better interpretation. However, given that the empirical data regarding the
functioning of the EU passport system and the national private placement regimes
is incomplete, this Comment will discuss key empirical questions and also identify
relevant facts and data that may affect whether the apparently better interpretation
is indeed the preferred approach.

A. Marketing
In the context of the Directive, “marketing” is a “direct or indirect offering
or placement,” made by or on behalf of a fund manager, of units or shares of a
fund that it manages to investors in the EU.69 A fund manager engaging in
marketing is subject to the Directive’s stringent regulatory requirements, as well
68

Equal application of the Directive to EU and third-country fund managers is a central goal of the
harmonized passport regime, which is intended to provide a “level playing field” for all fund
managers active in the EU. Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (‘AIFMD’):
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 7, at 2–3.

69

AIFMD, supra note 3, art. 4(x). A “direct or indirect offer or placement” refers to a sale. Id.
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as supervisory and enforcement actions by Competent Authorities.70 The
Competent Authorities of Member States may impose administrative penalties or
prohibit a fund manager from marketing to EU investors if the fund manager
engages in marketing and is found to have violated the Directive.71
However, the Directive does not apply where an EU investor approaches a
fund manager regarding a sale (this situation is referred to as a “reverse
solicitation”), provided that the fund manager “has not solicited the investor prior
to the approach.”72 In particular, Recital 70 of the Directive states that it does not
apply where a “professional investor established in the Union” invests “in [funds]
on its own initiative, irrespective of where the [fund manager] and/or the [fund]
is established.”73
Currently, each Member State’s Competent Authorities can define
“marketing” differently both under national private placement regimes and the
EU passport.74 This increases compliance costs for third-country fund managers
that market funds in multiple Member States because they must abide by each
Competent Authority’s rules regarding the scope of “marketing.”75 Moreover, this
system facilitates regulatory arbitrage by encouraging fund managers to register
and market in countries that interpret and enforce the Directive more loosely.76
The ESMA has identified the “divergent approaches with respect to marketing
rules” to be a central issue relating to the use of the EU passport.77 But the ESMA
and the Commission have provided no substantive guidance for defining this
term, so we must look elsewhere for clues on how to interpret “marketing.”
Similar EU financial law and the Member States’ various approaches to defining
the scope of “marketing” provide a good starting point.
70

See id. at recital 4 (explaining that the Directive applies to fund managers “performing management
and/or marketing activities within the Union”) (emphasis added). See also Emily Kehoe, Hedge Fund
“Regulation” for Systemic Risk: Largely Impossible, 14 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 35, 50 (2013) (“Non-EU [fund
managers] that manage assets located outside of the EU are only exempted from the complex
AIFMD requirements if they do not market [their funds] to EU investors”).

71

AIFMD, supra note 3, arts. 45(6)–(8). Competent authorities can request any information, carry out
on-site inspections, request the freezing of assets, withdraw the authorization granted to a fund
manager or depositary, or adopt any type of measure to ensure that fund managers or depositaries
remain in compliance with the applicable requirements of the Directive. Id. at art. 46(2).

72

Jeremy C. Jennings-Mares et al., The European Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive—A NonEU Fund Manager’s Perspective, 2013 WL 7143854, at *3 (2013).

73

AIFMD, supra note 3, at recital 70.
Sagan, supra note 1, at 513.

74
75
76
77

See id. at 513.
See supra Section I (defining “regulatory arbitrage” in the context of this Comment).
ESMA’s Opinion to the European Parliament, Council and Commission and Responses to the Call
for Evidence on the Functioning of the AIFMD EU Passport and of the National Private
Placement Regimes, ESMA/2015/1235, 16 (July 30, 2015).
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For instance, the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive and the
AIFMD have similar constructions and purposes.78 The Markets in Financial
Instruments Directive regulates investment companies and purports to reduce the
systemic risk created by their activities.79 Additionally, like the AIFMD, it aims to
harmonize the implementation and enforcement of its rules across the EU. The
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive is relevant in defining “marketing”
because it similarly regulates “marketing communication[s],” which it defines as
information addressed by the investment firm to the investor that pertains to the
services it offers and fees it charges.80 It further states that such communications
must be “fair, clear and not misleading” and must also be “clearly identifiable.”81
The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive standard is helpful in
considering interpretations of marketing under the AIFMD for two reasons. First,
it emphasizes the importance of honest and clear communications to investors.
This protects investors from false promises and deceptive advertising in
communications promoting funds. Second, it is important that marketing
communications with respect to the Directive are “clearly identifiable” so that
they can be easily distinguished by relevant stakeholders from other types of
communications, as marketing communications distributed in the EU subject
fund managers to the Directive’s burdensome rules.
As discussed earlier, Member States have interpreted and implemented
“marketing” differently. For example, the French and British Competent
Authorities define marketing contrarily.82 The French Monetary and Financial
Code defines marketing broadly as “any unsolicited contact made, through
whatever means, with a given individual or legal entity with a view to obtaining
agreement.”83 The United Kingdom (U.K.) has taken a narrower approach to
interpreting marketing, providing in its implementing regulations that an offering
or placement occurs when a person seeks to raise capital by making a unit or share
of a fund available for purchase by a potential investor. 84 The U.K.’s definition
emphasizes the offer of sale itself as marketing, which suggests that mere

78

79

80
81
82

See generally Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014
on Markets in Financial Instruments and Amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive
2011/61/EU (recast), 2014 O.J. (L 173) 349 [hereinafter MiFID II].
See Dirk A. Zetzsche & Thomas F. Marte, AIFMD versus MiFIDII/MiFIR: Similarities and Differences,
in THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND MANAGERS DIRECTIVE, supra note 4, at 119, 120.
MiFID II, supra note 78, at art. 24(3), (4).
Id. at art. 24(3).
See AIFMD 2014 Update, supra note 41, at 5.

83

Zetzsche & Marte, supra note 15, at 431, 444 (citing French Monetary and Financial Code, Art. L.
341-1).

84

Id. (citing Financial Conduct Authority, Perimeter Guidance (“PERG”) 8.37.5).
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promotions of financial services and other marketing materials may not fall under
the Directive.85
These definitions of “marketing” are consistent in holding that marketing
occurs in the wake of some form of unsolicited persuasion with the intent to
obtain an investment.86 However, they differ in what types of activities are deemed
solicitations and thus fall under the definition of marketing. This Comment will
address this gap by suggesting a broad and narrow interpretation of marketing
under the Directive, and articulating the types of promotions and activities that
fall within the scope of each.87 These interpretations offer greater specificity and
clarity than the Directive’s vague language, as well as that of the French and British
definitions.
Similar to France’s interpretation, this Comment will define the broad
interpretation of “marketing” to include any form of unsolicited contact with
intent to make a sale. This interpretation includes materials distributed or made
accessible to EU investors that promote a fund or fund manager. It also includes
communications that discuss specific investment services and directly or indirectly
connect those to a fund manager or any of the funds that he or she manages.
Communications do not fall under the definition of “marketing” if they simply
explain related investment services or the characteristics of different types of
funds generally, as long as they do not solicit investments or identify a fund
manager or his or her managed funds.88
Similar to Britain’s interpretation, this Comment will define the narrow
interpretation of “marketing” such that it emphasizes the actual offer of sale and
allows for limited distribution of marketing materials. This narrower interpretation
limits “marketing” to promotional materials or activities that expressly provide an
offer of sale or that clearly have the characteristics of one. Promotions that have
the characteristics of an offer of sale include those that encourage investors to
contact a fund manager or other fund representative to inquire about or invest in
a fund. In contrast, promotions that provide information only about investment
85

86
87

88

Id. (noting a potential distinction made by the U.K. authority between “financial promotions” and
“marketing”). See also AIFMD 2014 Update, supra note 41, at 5 (indicating that the U.K.’s narrow
interpretation may be beneficial in that it could allow a non-EU fund manager to engage in some
general “pre-marketing” activity without having to notify the U.K. regulatory authority).
Zetzsche & Marte, supra note 15, at 431, 444.
Both interpretations implicitly assume that indirect solicitations where the fund manager has a formal
or informal agreement with an intermediary to solicit EU investors will be subject to the same
standards as direct solicitations, with respect to what constitutes a marketing communication. See
AIFMD, supra note 3, art. 4(1)(x) (defining “marketing” to include “direct or indirect offering[s] or
placements[s]”) (emphasis added).
This exception is based on Rule 135a regarding “generic advertising” of the SEC’s general rules and
regulations for the Securities Act of 1933. 17 C.F.R. 230.135a.
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services offered by the fund and name the fund or fund manager are permitted,
as long as the promotional material contains a reasonably visible disclaimer that
the fund or fund manager is not compliant with the Directive.89

1. Cost-benefit analysis for the broad interpretation of marketing.
a) Benefits. Under the broad interpretation, “marketing” encompasses a larger
variety of activities. Unlike the narrow interpretation, the broad version not only
prohibits promotional materials that solicit investments, but also those that
directly or indirectly identify fund managers or their managed funds.
One benefit of the broad interpretation is that because a wider range of
promotional materials would fall within the Directive’s scope, the Directive will
regulate more fund manager activities. This result aligns with the Directive’s policy
objectives because it increases uniformity, or harmonization, and better protects
EU investors by subjecting more fund managers to the Directive’s highly
transparent and risk mitigating requirements, particularly if they solicit EU
investors. These measures may also reduce systemic risk, another central goal of
the Directive. Moreover, the more uniform compliance will generate cost
efficiencies through greater predictability and certainty with respect to the law.
A related benefit is less circumvention by fund managers who market or
manage funds in the EU. The broad scope of marketing will encourage more
funds to comply with the Directive instead of attempting to circumvent it,
especially if they want to actively participate in the EU market. This is because
fund managers will face a greater risk of being subject to the Directive’s
requirements due to the larger range of activities that constitute marketing than
under the narrow interpretation. If a Competent Authority determines that a fund
manager engaged in marketing, they could impose liability if the fund manager did
not meet the law’s strict standards. Moreover, fund managers who do comply will
have an advantage in light of their ability to identify themselves and their funds in
communications, and to directly solicit investors.
A final potential benefit is that the broad interpretation may allow relatively
easy and low cost enforcement. As this rule is broad and encompassing, it affords
limited exceptions that could lead to disputes, which will reduce administrative
and other social costs. This effect will be even greater if funds that wish to avoid
compliance choose to exit the market over risking circumvention, as a higher
proportion of funds in the EU market will be in compliance with the Directive.

89

This is a crucial distinction from the broad interpretation, as it implies that promotions like
billboards, television advertisements, and internet advertisements are not included within the
meaning of “marketing” as long as they do not clearly invite or encourage investment and they
contain a disclaimer.
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b) Costs. Although the broad interpretation will increase compliance and may
reduce enforcement expenses, it is associated with some important private and
social costs. If some fund managers exit the EU market due to the high burdens
of compliance and risks of liability under the broad interpretation of
“marketing,”90 fewer active funds will remain in the EU market. Fewer funds will
cause a decline in competition and will reduce investment options for EU
investors in the alternative investment funds market.
Another cost of the broad interpretation is that investors will bear much of
the increased compliance costs imposed on fund managers. Fund managers who
must comply with the Directive because of the broad scope of marketing will be
subject to a variety of structural and financial requirements, rigid corporate
governance requirements, periodic asset valuations, and transparency
requirements.91 With less disposable capital, fund managers will pass these costs
on to investors in the form of higher fees and lower returns.92
Finally, two social costs associated with the broad interpretation include a
decrease in innovation and negative liquidity effects. As previously discussed, the
expansive reach of “marketing” under the broad interpretation will cause more
funds to be subject to the Directive. The increased compliance costs spread over
a larger number of fund managers will likely reduce available capital for investment
in the European market, which could undermine financial innovation. 93
Furthermore, if fund managers have lower investable capital, this may result in
negative liquidity effects by decreasing the amount of cash that fund managers
invest in equity and bond markets. However, the extent of this effect depends on
the number of additional funds subject to the Directive under the broad
interpretation and the costs that compliance imposes upon them.
Based on the preceding analysis, the broad interpretation of marketing will
better encourage compliance with the Directive, promote uniform application of
the law, and increase transparency. It is also likely to reduce enforcement costs.
However, it will reduce investor choice in the fund market, diminish investment
returns, and negatively impact innovation and liquidity in the funds market.

2. Cost-benefit analysis for the narrow interpretation of marketing.
a) Benefits. The narrow interpretation of marketing allows fund managers to
market their funds through promotional materials and activities if they do not
90

See Sagan, supra note 1, at 513–14.

91

Kehoe, supra note 70, at 50.
See Peter McGowan & Kimberly Everitt, New Requirements Imposed on the European Alternative
Investment Funds Industry, 14 BUS. L. INT’L 105, 110 (2013) (noting how the costs of new leverage
requirements under the Directive “are likely to be borne ultimately by the [fund] and its investors”).

92

93

See Zetzsche, supra note 4, at 1, 11–12.
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have the characteristics of an offer of sale and do not clearly evidence an intent to
obtain one, as long as they also contain a disclaimer of non-compliance with the
Directive.
One benefit of the narrow interpretation is that it protects investors by
creating a diversification effect with respect to regulatory regimes. Holding all
fund managers and funds active in Europe subject to a single unified regime
creates a form of systemic risk,94 as problems with the Directive’s interpretation,
administration, and enforcement could substantially impact the market. For
example, the Directive concentrates liability for certain types of fund losses on
EU credit institutions, which creates the risk of bank runs if a fund’s losses are
significant and the credit institution overseeing it is of systemic importance.95
Investors could reduce the systemic risk associated with this regime if they can
invest in funds subject to various regulatory infrastructures.
A second benefit is that this interpretation may reduce private costs for EU
investors. Imagine that an investor contacts a third-country fund manager who
distributes promotions that do not fall within the narrow interpretation of
marketing because they do not have the characteristics of an offer of sale. To meet
the requirements under this definition of marketing, the promotions contain a
disclaimer of non-compliance with the Directive. This investor could presumably
negotiate for a discounted fee or higher-value service because of the risks the
investor faces without the strong protections of the Directive. Moreover, EU
professional investors are sophisticated and could appreciate these risks, and also
identify when they are present on account of the non-compliance disclaimer.96
Finally, under the narrow interpretation, third-country fund managers will
be less likely to exit the EU market because of the risks of liability than they would
under the broad interpretation. Fund managers not registered under the Directive
could not only maintain relationships with existing investors but could also
identify the nature of the investment services they offer in promotional materials.
This would allow them to continue expanding their investor base in the EU
market without having to comply with the Directive. More funds active in the EU
will give investors more choices and the ability to more efficiently allocate their
capital to funds that produce higher returns. Furthermore, third-country funds
that would otherwise have exited the EU market can instead continue to provide
it with liquidity and competition.
b) Costs. An important cost of the narrow interpretation of marketing is that
it creates a greater risk of circumvention than the broad version. One problem
with circumvention is that it undermines the Directive’s goal of risk management

95

Kehoe, supra note 70, at 63 (arguing that the Directive’s rigid approach to hedge fund regulation
“will actually contribute to the creation of systemic risk in the hedge fund industry”).
See id. at 63–64.

96

See AIFMD, supra note 3, art. 4(1) (defining “professional investors”).

94
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at both the investor and systemic levels. At the investor level, the more flexible
rules on promotional materials and other communications with current clients
about new services create informational asymmetries. While circumventing fund
managers must make required disclosures according to the rules of their home
country’s regulatory regime, they may choose not to release some of the
information regarding their risk exposures that fund managers subject to the
Directive must disclose. Accordingly, EU investors might lack relevant
information in making an investment decision.
In terms of systemic risk, circumvention would allow fund managers to
avoid the Directive’s highly transparent regulatory regime with its strong limits on
leverage and substantial liquidity requirements. Consequently, fund managers
might engage in more speculative investing that increases systemic risk,
particularly if their home country regulations are more lenient.
Another cost associated with circumvention is that it may create competitive
disparities. The narrow interpretation may put EU fund managers at a competitive
disadvantage on their own home turf because some of their third-country based
competitors face lower regulatory costs and burdens by being subject only to their
home jurisdiction’s regulatory requirements.97 This problem could become worse
if circumventing fund managers establish more subsidiaries in the EU and expand
their activities so as to take advantage of this regulatory discrepancy.98 However,
the negative effects of circumvention would be lower if the third-countries where
such fund managers are based have similarly strict regulatory regimes.
It is not yet clear whether third-countries admitted to the passport regime
will have regulatory frameworks similar to the Directive, and for those that do
not, whether their agreements with EU authorities will efficiently close the gaps
in substantive legal rules and their enforcement.99 The comprehensive analysis that
the ESMA is undertaking to determine which third-countries should be admitted
to the passport regime should help minimize discrepancies between the regulatory
frameworks of admitted countries and the Directive.100 However, the laws and
97

98

99
100

This will only be an issue where the home jurisdiction of circumventing third-country fund
managers has a more lenient regulatory regime than the Directive.
Although third-country fund managers that manage assets in the EU will not be exempted from
the Directive, they could likely continue to manage assets in their home third-countries and simply
establish subsidiaries in the EU for promotional purposes.
See ESMA’s Advice, supra note 11, at 10.
See id. at 7–11 (setting out the following criteria upon which the ESMA is analyzing third-countries
for potential admission to the passport regime: (1) experiences with existing agreements between
EU and third-country Competent Authorities under the national private placement regime; (2) the
extent of investor protection; (3) differences in the regulatory environment and potential for
regulatory arbitrage; (4) obstacles to competition; and (5) systemic risk associated with the thirdcountry’s legal regime).
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enforcement capacities of third-countries may differ, and the many rigid corporate
governance requirements, leverage limits, liquidity requirements, periodic asset
valuations, and transparency requirements of the Directive suggest that it may
impose substantially higher costs than the regulatory regimes of the admitted
countries.101
A third cost is that the narrow interpretation may undermine the standard
set forth in the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, an EU directive that
closely parallels the AIFMD.102 As discussed above, this directive holds that
marketing communications should be “fair, clear and not misleading” and also
“clearly identifiable.”103 Although fund managers cannot use promotional
materials that directly solicit investors under the narrow interpretation, they can
still discuss the investment services offered by their funds, and may be able to
include basic performance metrics. These materials might attract and mislead
investors, particularly if the fund exaggerates strong performance metrics or fails
to disclose important risks. Moreover, they may be difficult to distinguish from
communications that solicit investors and subject a fund or fund manager to the
Directive from those that do not. The uncertainty in determining which
communications fall within the definition of marketing will likely result in
administrative costs and potentially significant error costs for fund managers that
incorrectly believe their communications do not constitute marketing.104
The narrow interpretation provides a beneficial diversification effect by
spreading risk across multiple regulatory regimes. It also reduces private costs and
is less likely to drive third-country fund managers out of the EU market than the
broad interpretation. Yet, this approach increases risk for fund investors and may
result in a net increase in systemic risk. It is also less compatible with the definition
of “marketing communications” in the Markets in Financial Instruments
Directive, and the uncertainty of which communications constitute marketing may
result in higher administrative costs than under the broad interpretation.

101

102
103
104

Kehoe, supra note 70, at 50–53. See also id. at 38–39 (contrasting the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s focus on information gathering with the Directive’s efforts to reduce systemic risk
through an “attempt to dismantle the hedge fund industry,” but acknowledging that the Securities
and Exchange Commission may be stepping up its enforcement efforts against hedge funds).
See Zetzsche & Marte, supra note 79, at 119, 119–25.
See MiFID II, supra note 78, art. 24(3).
Cf. A. A. Sommer Jr., Who’s “In Control”? – S.E.C., 21 BUS. L. 559, 563 (1966) (noting the importance
of determining the meaning of a “controlling person” in United States securities law and that the
lack of clarity has led to the development of “imprecise limits” through the “painstaking process of
rule, interpretation, judicial decision and ad hoc determinations in ‘no action letters’”). See also id.
(observing that this uncertainty is potentially very costly for persons who incorrectly determine that
they do not fall within the definition of “controlling person”).
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3. Preferred interpretation and empirical questions.
Based on the preceding cost-benefit analysis, it appears that the broad
interpretation better serves the Directive’s policy objectives of risk management
and harmonization. The more expansive scope of “marketing” will provide a more
level playing field and encourage third-country fund managers that are active in
the EU to comply with the Directive’s requirements given the higher liability risk.
Moreover, the high transparency and liquidity requirements and the restrictions
on leverage will apply to more funds than under the narrow interpretation,
providing investors with greater protection. Although this approach will likely
cause some fund managers to leave the EU market, many third-country funds
more active in the EU market will likely remain. In contrast, the narrow
interpretation protects investors through regulatory diversification, reduces
financial costs for investors, and may have positive liquidity and competition
effects. Yet, its greater opportunities for circumvention undermine the Directive’s
objectives of risk management and harmonization.
Although the broad interpretation seems to better serve the Directive’s
policy objectives, it is important to recognize its potentially significant costs. These
costs include the enforcement burdens of monitoring the additional activities that
subject a fund manager to the Directive, higher fees and lower returns for
investors, and less market liquidity and financial innovation. Though the narrow
interpretation would result in circumvention costs and more significant linedrawing problems with regards to what constitutes a “marketing” communication,
the overall costs of the broad interpretation may be higher if compliance costs are
substantial.
While it is important that the Commission’s approach support the
Directive’s policy goals, the Commission should weigh these goals against the
relevant costs. Moreover, the Commission and ESMA should investigate the
following empirical questions before the Commission sets forth a legislative act
that interprets or clarifies the Directive’s language regarding the meaning of
“marketing.”
First, the Commission should consider whether greater overall compliance
with the Directive would in fact better protect EU investors than corresponding
laws in other countries. If the countries admitted to the third-country passport
system have strong regulatory regimes in place that provide many of the same
protections as the Directive, then achieving a higher level of overall compliance
and avoiding circumvention is not as important. In that case, the narrower
interpretation’s lower economic costs favor adopting that approach.
Relatedly, it would be useful to know whether the Directive imposes
significantly higher burdens on third-country funds than their home regulators do,
particularly for those that join the third-country passport system. If it does not,
then the increase in compliance obligations may not be as costly as assumed in the
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preceding cost-benefit analysis, and using the broad interpretation will allow for
more uniformity while also keeping the increased costs to fund managers to a
reasonable level. However, if compliance costs are high, then the narrow
interpretation may be preferred since its relative benefits for innovation, liquidity,
and consumer choice are more likely to outweigh the costs of undermining the
Directive’s policy goals of harmonization and risk management.

B. The Equivalence Requirement
The second vague provision of the Directive analyzed in this Comment is
the “equivalence requirement.”105 This rule is significant in light of the expansion
of the passport regime to include third-countries because it provides an exemption
from compliance with the Directive where a legal rule in a third-country directly
conflicts with a provision of the Directive and certain conditions are met.106
A third-country fund manager that markets funds using the passport system
(after it is expanded to cover third-countries) must fully comply with the Directive,
except for Chapter VI, which concerns fund managers managing specific types of
funds.107 However, this compliance requirement does not apply in circumstances
where a provision of the Directive is “incompatible with compliance with the law
to which the non-EU [fund manager] and/or the non-EU [fund] marketed in the
Union is subject” and the fund manager can demonstrate that: (a) it is impossible
for it to comply with both laws; (b) “the law to which the non-EU [fund manager]
and/or non-EU [fund] is subject provides for an equivalent rule having the same
regulatory purpose and offering the same level of protection to the investors of
the relevant [fund];” and (c) the non-EU fund manager and/or the non-EU fund
complies with the equivalent rule indicated in point (b).108 This exception is known
as an “equivalence requirement.”109
While there is no clear authoritative guidance on the equivalence
requirement as applied to the authorization of third-country fund managers under
the passport system, Article 21(6)(b) offers some insights because it incorporates
a similar equivalence requirement concerning the regulation and supervision of
depositaries.110 This Article provides that depositaries in third-countries must be
105
106
107
108
109
110

See AIFMD, supra note 3.
See id., art. 37(2).
Zetzsche & Marte, supra note 15, at 431, 470 (citing AIFMD, art. 37(2)).
AIFMD, supra note 3, art. 37(2).
Zetzsche & Marte, supra note 15, at 431, 471.
AIFMD, supra note 3, art. 21(6)(b). See also id. at art. 21(7)–(10) (noting that a “depositary” is
responsible for monitoring a fund’s cash flows, acting on behalf of the fund and fund manager,
safe-keeping financial assets, performing calculations required under the Directive, and carrying out
the instructions of the fund manager unless they conflict with applicable national law).
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subject to regulations and supervision that “have the same effect as Union law
and are effectively enforced.”111 In the Primary Directive Regulation, the
Commission clarified and supplemented this depositary equivalence
requirement.112 The Primary Directive Regulation holds that a third-country law
preempts a Directive requirement if, among other things, the depositary is subject
to ongoing supervision by an authority with adequate resources to fulfill its tasks
and the “law of the third country provides for the application of sufficiently
dissuasive enforcement actions in the event of breach by the depositary.”113
However, there is no guarantee that the same criteria will apply to
equivalence provisions regarding the authorization of third-country fund
managers to market or manage funds in the EU under the third-country passport
regime.114 In fact, the differences in the language of the Article 21(6)(b)
equivalence provision and the one under Article 37(2) suggest that they should
not be interpreted or applied identically. As stated previously, Article 21(6)(b)
requires that third-country fund managers and funds be subject to regulations and
supervision in their home country that “have the same effect as Union law and
are effectively enforced.”115 In contrast, Article 37(2) requires that the conflicting
third-country law provide “an equivalent rule having the same regulatory purpose
and offering the same level of protection to the investors of the relevant [fund].”116
Thus, unlike Article 21(6)(b), Article 37(2) emphasizes the purpose behind
the conflicting rule and does not contemplate effects beyond those related to the
level of protection that investors receive. Moreover, Article 37(2) applies to “the
investors of the relevant [fund]” and not just “EU investors.”117 This suggests that
the conflicting third-country rule must provide the “same level of protection” as
the corresponding Directive rule for both EU and third-country investors, and that
the effects of the rule should not be assessed beyond any relevant funds. 118
Accordingly, this Comment will incorporate these implications as assumptions of
how the Article 37(2) equivalence requirement should be read for both of the
interpretations that are evaluated below.
Equivalence is “best understood as implying a holistic test with benchmarks
that focus on high comparability between regulatory and supervisory outcomes,
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

Id. at 21(6)(b).
Primary Directive Regulation, supra note 29, art. 84.
Id. at art. 84(f).
Zetzsche & Marte, supra note 15, at 431, 471. See also AIFMD, supra note 3, art. 37(1).
AIFMD, supra note 3, art. 21(6)(b).
Id. at art. 37(2)(b).
Id. at art. 37(2).
Compare id. (“the same level of protection to the investors of the relevant AIF”) with id. at art. 37(3)
(“between the EU investors of the relevant AIF . . .”) (emphasis added).
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rather than rigid line-by-line examinations of similarities and differences, and a
quest for exact mirroring of practices and philosophies.”119 Inherent in this view
are the concepts of cost equivalence and functional equivalence.120
“Cost equivalence” requires that the costs imposed on financial
intermediaries by the laws and supervisory practices of the Member State hosting
funds and fund managers be comparable to the costs imposed on intermediaries
by the third-country fund manager’s home country legal regime.121 In contrast,
“functional equivalence,” an outcome-based approach, requires that the rules of
two countries produce similar results.122 The functional approach holds that the
formal similarity or dissimilarity of rules and standards between the third-country
and Member State host country are not critical, as different methods may achieve
the same level of regulatory protection.123
This Comment will propose and evaluate two interpretations of the language
in the equivalence requirement under Article 37(2) of the Directive that reflect the
principles of cost and functional equivalence, respectively. As discussed above,
each will assume that this equivalence requirement applies to both EU and thirdcountry investors of any funds, and that any effects beyond these investors or
funds falls outside the scope of this rule. Additionally, under both interpretations,
this Comment will infer the word “same” in Article 37(2)(b) to mean “substantially
similar.”124 These interpretations of Article 37(2) differ based on how they define
“impossible” and what they consider to constitute “the same level of protection
to the investors of the relevant [fund].”125
The first interpretation is the “cost equivalence” approach. For Article 37(2)
to be satisfied, this approach requires that a fund manager and fund be subject to
substantially similar costs and burdens under a third-country’s laws as apply under
the Directive. Under this reading, the language “impossible to combine such
compliance” means that a fund manager cannot possibly comply with both a
provision of the Directive and a binding legal rule in the fund manager’s home
country concurrently (a phenomenon this Comment refers to as “objective
119

120

121
122
123
124
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Zetzsche & Marte, supra note 15, at 431, 472 (citing EILÍS FERRAN & LOOK CHAN HO, CORPORATE
FINANCE LAW 417 (2d ed. 2014)).
These two concepts contrast with formal equivalence, which requires that the rules of the third-country
and Member State not only produce similar results, but that they also are characterized by
substantially similar form and substance. Id. at 472.
Id.
Id.
Id.
This accords with the understanding of equivalence requirements set forth by Eilís Ferran and Look
Chan Ho, discussed above. See supra note 120. It avoids the need for “formal equivalence” of
Member State and third-country rules in terms of virtually identical language or form.
AIFMD, supra note 3, art. 37(2).
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impossibility”).126 Additionally, this interpretation will find the requirement for an
“equivalent rule . . . offering the same level of protection to the investors of the
relevant [fund]” to be met if the costs and burdens imposed on fund managers and
funds complying with each set of laws is substantially similar.127
The second interpretation is the “functional equivalence” approach. This
approach is outcome-based and requires that a third-country rule conflicting with
the Directive produce substantially similar results. Under this reading, the language
“impossible to combine such compliance” includes within its scope situations in
which it would be extremely difficult for a fund manager to comply with a Directive
provision and third-country legal rule simultaneously (“subjective
impossibility”).128 Furthermore, this approach finds the requirement for an
“equivalent rule . . . offering the same level of protection to the investors of the
relevant [fund]” met if the conflicting rule produces substantially similar results
with respect to the level of protection for fund investors.

1. Cost-benefit analysis for the cost equivalence approach.
a) Benefits. The first benefit afforded by the cost equivalence approach is one
that also supported the broad interpretation of marketing, namely that it
minimizes circumvention. The literal reading of “impossible” as objective
impossibility will prohibit a fund manager from obtaining an exemption from
compliance with a Directive provision under Article 37(2) in all but the few cases
in which the fund manager cannot possibly comply with a rule in its home
jurisdiction that is incompatible with the Directive.129 Moreover, even if
compliance with both rules is impossible, the exemption can apply only if the costs
and burdens imposed by the third-country rule are substantially similar to those
under the Directive and the fund manager complies with this rule. Accordingly,
this interpretation prevents fund managers from abusing this rule to circumvent
(but not violate) the Directive. The reduction in circumvention has the same
benefits discussed in the analysis of marketing above, including providing
investors with the significant protections of the Directive and making it easier for

126

127

The strict requirement of compliance if at all possible minimizes the number of instances in which
a fund manager can circumvent a provision of the Directive, thereby limiting circumstances in
which the fund manager or fund is subject to different costs or burdens under a third-country’s
laws.
See AIFMD, supra note 3, art. 37(2)(b).
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The use of “extremely difficult” in place of “impossible” fits with the functional equivalence
approach because it will only allow non-compliance where a fund or fund manager faces very
substantial burdens in complying with both laws. Article 37(2)(b) would still require that the thirdcountry rule provide substantially similar results with respect to the protection of investors.

129

See AIFMD, supra note 3, art. 37(2).
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them to compare funds, as well as promoting uniformity in the Directive’s
application.
A second benefit of the cost equivalence approach is that by focusing on the
costs and burdens imposed by the conflicting third-country rule, it helps prevent
funds and fund managers subject to a third country’s regulatory regime from
obtaining an unfair competitive advantage over their EU-based competitors.130
This interpretation will not allow fund managers to engage in regulatory arbitrage
by taking advantage of incompatible provisions in a third-country’s laws to obtain
exemptions under Article 37(2) that will reduce their incurred costs.131 As a result,
fund managers will not be able to leverage these cost savings to improve
operations, cover expenses, or charge lower fees than their competitors that are
subject to the full requirements of the Directive.
A third benefit is that the interpretation of impossible as objectively
impossible is more consistent with the plain language of the Directive than
interpreting it to mean “extremely difficult.” In common usage, the word
“impossible” generally refers to something “incapable of being or of occurring.”132
This understanding of impossible supports apparent legislative intent since EU
legislators elected to use prohibitive language instead of more lenient language.
Unfortunately, it does not appear that EU law or the literature provides clear
guidance on how to interpret “impossible” in the context of the Directive.133
A final benefit is that the cost equivalence approach provides a clear brightline rule with few exceptions. “Impossible” under this approach is a strict standard
and is easier to apply than “extremely difficult,” as the latter could apply to various
situations where a fund manager incurs high costs or burdens from complying
with conflicting rules. Moreover, it is not too difficult to determine whether costs
and burdens imposed by regulations are substantially similar under the Directive
and a third-country’s legal regime by comparing the language and scope of
relevant law, as well as enforcement efforts. Consequently, the cost equivalence
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Zetzsche & Marte, supra note 15, at 431, 472.
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See supra Section I (defining “regulatory arbitrage” in the context of this Comment).
Impossible, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY. http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/impossible (last visited Apr. 16, 2016).
The use of alternate constructions of the word “impossible” in various EU laws, as identified in the
literature and case law, highlights the uncertainty of the term’s meaning. See, for example, Mihail
Danov & Florian Becker Introduction, to CROSS-BORDER EU COMPETITION LAW ACTIONS, 1, 8
(Mihail Danov, Florian Becker & Paul Beaumont, eds. 2013) (noting that Member States must not
make “practically impossible” or “excessively difficult” the exercise of rights granted under EU law.
See also Opinion of A.G. Wahl, Case C-527/12, European Commission v. Federal Republic of
Germany (2014), ECLI:EU:C:2014:90, 8-9, 17 (describing EU case law on the defense of “absolute
impossibility,” which requires a person to show (1) the occurrence of an event that the person could
not influence and (2) the exercise of all reasonable efforts to avoid its consequences, and also
referring to this as “objectively impossible”).
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approach offers relatively low administrative and enforcement costs, along with
high transparency.
b) Costs. An important cost of the cost equivalence approach is that, like
many bright-line rules, it is over-inclusive. The strict and unforgiving
interpretation of “impossible” as objective impossibility will require compliance
with the Directive even where it is possible but extremely costly or burdensome.
This may at times put third-country fund managers between the proverbial “rock
and a hard place,” as they will have to choose whether to subject themselves to
liability and potential loss of the privilege to market funds in the EU, or to bear a
burden that may competitively disadvantage them in all of their active markets. In
addition, this approach could be over-inclusive if conflicting rules in the Directive
and third-countries generally achieve the same empirical results by imposing
different regulatory hurdles. The cost equivalence approach compares only the
costs and burdens imposed, so it would not take into account these divergent
means of achieving the same ends.
The losses that third-country fund managers may suffer in the event of a
conflict that can only be overcome by costly action would generate several
undesirable outcomes. First, the higher costs incurred by these funds would
reduce their available capital for investments, which would consequently decrease
their returns. Fund managers might need to charge higher fees or cut some of
their offered investment services to avoid financial distress. Second, the lower
profitability may cause some fund managers to exit the EU market if the burden
that Article 37(2) imposes is costly enough to exceed the benefits of continuing
to market funds in the EU. Third, fund managers facing the lose-lose dilemma
described above may make financially unsound and socially suboptimal decisions,
such as firing well-performing employees and funneling investment funds or
proceeds into compliance and risk management, instead of investing productively.
Lastly, the cost equivalence approach does not accurately reflect reality.
Countries other than the EU have also responded to the recent global economic
crises with legislation and regulations to address the risks of alternative investment
funds. However, their frameworks differ significantly, and it is highly unlikely that
many third countries will pursue the objectives of promoting uniformity,
protecting investors, or reducing systemic risk by imposing the same kinds of costs
and burdens that the Directive does.134 Consequently, there may be few cases in
which a conflicting third-country rule creates substantially similar costs and
burdens, which could render the exemption empty in practice.
As this analysis has demonstrated, the benefits of the cost equivalence
approach are that it minimizes circumvention, limits the ability of third-country
fund managers to obtain competitive advantages over fund managers based in the
134

See generally Kehoe, supra note 70 (distinguishing the approaches of regulation in the United States
and under the Directive).
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EU, that it is more consistent with the common usage of the term “impossible,”
and that it offers a bright-line rule that minimizes administrative and enforcement
costs. On the other hand, the costs are that it may be over-inclusive and unduly
burdensome on third-country fund managers, it would reduce returns for
investors and result in suboptimal decision-making, and that it does not comport
with the reality that the regulatory regimes of other countries have not adopted
the same methods for accomplishing the same policy goals.

2. Cost-benefit analysis for the functional equivalence approach.
a) Benefits. Unlike the cost equivalence approach, the functional equivalence
approach is not a bright-line rule, but rather a more flexible standard that
incorporates a degree of equity. It does so by allowing third-country fund
managers to avoid compliance where there is a direct conflict of rules and where
compliance would be highly prejudicial to the fund manager by forcing higher
regulatory costs on it than its competition faces. In particular, by broadening the
scope of “impossible” to include “extremely difficult,” the subjective impossibility
view allows a fund manager to avoid complying with a rule in the Directive if it
would be extremely costly or burdensome to comply with both laws
simultaneously. For example, if the applicable third-country law prohibited
disclosure of certain sensitive information for national security reasons, but this
information was incorporated into information that had to be disclosed under the
Directive, a fund manager might meet the “impossibility” prong of Article 37(2)
by showing that separating such information would be extremely costly or
burdensome.
A second benefit of the functional equivalence approach is that it aligns with
equivalence requirements in related EU financial law. Equivalence requirements
run throughout pan-European market infrastructure regulations, such as
regulations for credit rating agencies and central securities depositaries.135 These
regulations generally hold that, with respect to an equivalence requirement, a
“proportionate, outcomes-based approach should be taken.”136 Moreover, “it
should be sufficient that the third-country regulatory regime achieve the same
objectives and effects in practice.”137 This language strongly accords with the
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Zetzsche & Marte, supra note 15, at 431, 475.
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Parliament and Council Regulation 909/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23
July 2014 on Improving Securities Settlement in the European Union and on Central Securities
Depositories and Amending Directives 98/26/EC and 2014/65/EU and Regulation (EU) No
236/2012, 2014 O.J. (L 257) 14, recital 75.
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Parliament and Council Regulation 462/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21
May 2013 Amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies, 2013 O.J. (L 146)
10, recital 48.
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functional equivalence approach, which is outcome-based and focused on the
effective results of the conflicting rules.
A final benefit is that, not only does this approach better reflect the reality
of different regulatory regimes using different methods to obtain the same ends,
it also follows more directly from the language in Article 37(2)(b). This Article
requires that if two rules conflict, the third-country law must provide for “an
equivalent rule having the same regulatory purpose and offering the same level of
protection to the investors of the relevant [fund].”138 A third-country rule offering
the same level of protection in its results but not its means appears to effectively
meet this requirement, which suggests that the regulatory obstacles necessary to
achieve those results are immaterial.
b) Costs. The functional equivalence approach will provide more
opportunities to circumvent the Directive than the cost equivalence
interpretation. Because “impossible” implies “extremely difficult” under this
approach, fund managers could invoke Article 37(2) more often. Furthermore,
fund managers will have more leeway to argue that they would face high costs or
burdens in complying with both the Directive and a conflicting third-country rule,
whether or not these costs are actually substantial. With respect to Article 37(2)(b),
fund managers could also point to self-serving data that suggests that the empirical
results of the rules are substantially similar. This approach could be costly if fund
managers can invoke this exemption frequently enough to obtain a competitive
advantage over EU-based fund managers who must comply with the applicable
rule.
A second and related cost of the functional equivalence approach is that
“extremely difficult” is a less clear standard, and thus will likely result in higher
administration and enforcement costs. It will be difficult for authorities to
establish what conduct falls within this line, which may cause more adjudication
in gray areas and the court expenses, lawyer fees, and procedural battles associated
with it. Moreover, judges who lack expertise in financial matters may find
themselves at the mercy of sophisticated fund managers who vigorously argue that
the exemption applies.
A third cost is that comparing the empirical results of two conflicting rules
is a more costly and difficult exercise than comparing the costs and burdens that
they impose on funds and fund managers. Authorities will need to acquire
sufficient empirical data, but they may not have the infrastructure to do so for
some rules that conflict with the Directive. As a result, governments and,
ultimately, taxpayers will pay for data collection efforts and the resources required
for its analysis. This problem may be exacerbated if various countries analyze and
compare results differently, creating competitive disparities and facilitating
regulatory arbitrage. In particular, third-country fund managers could invoke the
138
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Article 37(2) exemption more often if their home jurisdiction compared results
more broadly. Accordingly, this interpretation might create some of the same
inefficiencies and costs that currently characterize the divergent national private
placement regimes as compared with a uniform passport system.139
The above analysis shows that the benefits of the functional equivalence
interpretation include that it is less apt to unfairly prejudice third-country fund
managers, it aligns with equivalence requirements in related EU financial law, and
it is more compatible with the language in Article 37(2)(b). Costs of this approach
are that it allows fund managers more frequent access to the exemption and thus
reduces the extent of their compliance with it, the “extremely difficult” standard
is hard to apply and will impose significant administrative and enforcement costs,
and comparing the results of two conflicting rules will be more challenging than
comparing the costs and burdens they impose.

3. Preferred interpretation and empirical questions.
The cost-benefit analysis suggests that from both a policy and a cost and
efficiency standpoint, the cost equivalence approach is the better choice. It is a
bright-line rule that reduces administrative and enforcement costs and facilitates
a more uniform application of the Directive. Furthermore, by promoting uniform
application of the Directive and higher compliance, this approach will better serve
the Directive’s goals of harmonization and investor protection. However, the cost
equivalence approach may lead to undesirable outcomes for third-country fund
managers if they must comply with both a third-country law and the Directive,
despite incurring extremely high costs in doing so.
To reduce the harsh and more restrictive nature of the cost equivalence
approach, the Commission might instead interpret “impossible” to mean
“extremely difficult.” The relaxation of that standard would help balance the
potential over-inclusiveness of the requirement that a conflicting third-country
rule impose the same costs and burdens on fund managers, as discussed above.
The functional equivalence approach better aligns with other equivalence
requirements in EU financial law and reflects the reality that different countries
have unique approaches to achieve the same objectives. However, this approach
is more costly, and divergent application of it may create competitive disparities
and opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. Also, the costs of comparing the
empirical results of many potentially conflicting rules would probably be
significant, and investors and taxpayers would likely absorb these costs. Lastly, the
“extremely difficult” standard is unclear and would promote litigation and selfserving testimony, which less financially sophisticated judges could find difficult
to identify.
139

See supra Section II. See also Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (‘AIFMD’):
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Although the cost-benefit analysis favored the cost equivalence view, two
important factors could influence whether this is indeed the preferred approach.
First, if countries admitted to the third-country passport system have regulatory
regimes that impose similar costs and burdens as the Directive, then the cost
equivalence approach may be better since it can still reasonably, though less
effectively, compare how effective investor protection measures are. On the other
hand, if the burdens they impose to achieve similar outcomes diverge significantly,
the functional equivalence approach may be best. Second, if the Commission
clarifies how the functional equivalence approach should be applied in practice so
that authorities can apply it more uniformly, then the functional approach may be
preferred, provided that it is not defined so narrowly as to facilitate circumvention.
With respect to the interpretation of “impossible,” the ESMA should collect
and analyze data on how the Article 37(2) exemption applies to countries that the
agency recommends for admission to the third-country passport system. In
particular, it should seek to determine whether there will be many direct rule
conflicts and whether compliance with both conflicting rules in those contexts
would be impossible or even extremely difficult. If there are more potential
conflicts, it would be preferable to interpret “impossible” as subjective
impossibility because the objective impossibility view would impose substantial
costs on third-country fund managers that would likely place them at a significant
competitive disadvantage relative to their EU peers, or even prohibit them from
marketing or managing their funds in the EU altogether.

V. C ONCLUSION
The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive introduces the novelty
of a pan-European passport regime for third-country fund managers. If the
Commission implements it after carefully considering the implications of relevant
data collected and analyzed by the ESMA, then the legislative act it enacts may
well promote the Directive’s goals of harmonization and risk management. One
of the crucial challenges in implementing this expanded passport system is
establishing clear interpretations of vague provisions of the Directive that will
promote the Directive’s policy objectives, align with the Directive’s language and
implementing legislative acts, maintain consistency with EU financial law, and
minimize private and social costs.
This Comment provided a systemic cost-benefit analysis framework for the
interpretation of vague provisions of the Directive and applied it to the definition
of “marketing” and the “equivalence requirement,” endeavoring to identify which
of two interpretations was preferred for each of these provisions. Furthermore, it
discussed important costs and benefits that may apply to the interpretation of
other vague provisions. Ultimately, the ideal interpretation for each of these
provisions will depend on the answers to relevant empirical questions, which can
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best be investigated by the ESMA. The Commission should carefully consider the
policy implications and economic consequences of these interpretations in light
of this data as it prepares to implement the third-country passport system.

Summer 2016

305

